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“Overall, we have done pretty well. In some areas, we could have done better” 
- Ambassador Paul van den IJssel, President, 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Seventh Review Conference 
 
2011 was a year of particular importance to the BWC. It was an opportunity to shape 
the direction that the treaty would take in coming years and ensure that it would remain at the 
forefront of efforts to prevent the use of disease as a weapon. Hopes for the future were high. 
Annual meetings had been constructive and the atmosphere positive. There was momentum. 
There had been an exhaustive, open-ended preparatory process which provided multiple 
opportunities to explore technical issues, flag concerns, find compromises, and build the 
foundations for success. States parties gathered in Geneva in December 2011 to reflect on what 
they had achieved, and looked forward to what they wished to accomplish in the next five 
years. 
 
Recent Work of the BWC 
 
In 2011, the BWC held its Seventh Review Conference. These meetings, which take 
place every five years, “review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that 
the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention… are being realized [and 
to]… take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention.”2 BWC review conferences do not happen in isolation; they are part of a more 
frequent work program. Since 1991, states parties have met annually. From 1992 to 1994, states 
parties focused on scientific and technical aspects of efforts to verify compliance with the 
treaty. 
From 1995 to 2001, states parties worked to build a new international legal framework (which 
was ultimately abandoned after the BWC’s Fifth Review Conference was suspended in 2001). 
The Seventh Review Conference marked the end of a second cycle (2007 to 2010) of 
annual meetings to strengthen how the international obligations of the BWC are translated into 
effective national action.3 Each year, states parties gathered to explore one or two specific 
topics. 
The work was built on a pair of meetings: one in the middle of the year at the expert level to 
gather relevant information, and another at the end of the year at the states parties-level to 
identify shared approaches and opportunities for further action. In 2007, the BWC looked at 
national legislative and regulatory frameworks as well as regional cooperation. In 2008, we 
looked at biosafety and biosecurity and the oversight of science, education, and outreach for 
scientists. In 2009, states parties focused on building the capacity to deal with disease 
regardless of cause. In 2010, the focus was on responding to allegations on the use of biological 
weapons.4 
For each of these topics, states parties succeeded in identifying a range of common 
understandings.5 These were not new agreements negotiated between states, but rather areas of 
similarity in existing national approaches. Additionally, the states parties formed islands of 
agreements in broader areas in which national views differed. These agreements serve as a firm 
foundation for building bridges across areas of disagreement in the future. Overall, the 
meetings benefitted immensely from the active contributions made by a broad range of 
stakeholders from both the public and private sectors.6 These meetings have helped build a 
vibrant and robust community dedicated to ensuring that biology is not used to cause deliberate 
harm. 
 
 
3 
BWC Seventh Review Conference 
 
There were exhaustive preparations for the Seventh Review Conference. In April 2011, 
the preparatory committee saw important decisions being made on how states parties should 
work.7 A series of informal meetings around the world helped states parties focus on what they 
needed to address. There were workshops in Wilton Park, UK; Beijing, China; Montreux, 
Switzerland; Berlin, Germany; Manila, Philippines; The Hague, Netherlands; Belgrade, Serbia; 
Lima, Peru; and Geneva, Switzerland.8 Participants in these meetings explored a broad range 
of topics and set solid foundations for the review conference. In parallel, states parties carried 
out their own preparations. By the end of November 2011, over twenty working papers 
detailing national views, priorities, and positions were already available on the BWC’s 
website.9 The president of the 2011 Review Conference, Ambassador Paul van den IJssel from 
the Netherlands, held a series of informal consultations to explore where there might be 
common understandings in specific areas.10 These meetings addressed how states parties might 
review relevant advances in science and technology; how they might improve their working 
relationships through a more structured approach of cooperation and assistance; as well as what 
they might work on over the coming years. 
Seven issues were raised repeatedly and formed the basis for preparations of the review 
conference: 
 
• A new work program for the BWC – on what and how should states parties take their 
efforts forward? 
• Annual exchanges of information – how best to improve transparency and thereby 
increase confidence in compliance? 
• Relevant advances in science and technology – how often and through what mechanisms 
should states parties look at such developments? 
• Universalization – how to increase treaty membership, which at 165 members lags 
behind other important security treaties? 
• Cooperation and assistance – how to improve the way states parties work together and 
with their international partners to build capacity and promote the peaceful uses of 
biological science and technology? 
• Compliance and verification – what, if anything, can be done to ensure that states parties 
are complying with their obligations and properly implementing the treaty? 
• Levels of institutional support – what levels of human, financial, and logistical support 
will states parties require to make all this work?11 
The president of the conference believed these were the “areas where there seems to be a 
general understanding that something will need to be done if the review conference is to be 
considered a success.”12 How much progress was actually made? 
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The Next Intersessional Process 
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
The most recent intersessional meetings of the BWC were largely considered useful. 
There were, however, a growing number of voices suggesting that it was time for a change.13 
Some suggested that the format of recent meetings was too restrictive, confining discussions 
to pre-identified topics and an artificial pace. Others suggested that the recent process provides 
too few opportunities to take collective action, as opposed to having discussions or identifying 
common understandings. States parties also heard that while there was work left to be done on 
the topics covered between 2003 and 2010, “set piece” international meetings might yield less 
additional value than alternative approaches. For example, it was suggested that the BWC 
should embrace working groups; this, it was argued, would enable additional work between 
meetings of the BWC and allow more flexibility to pick up and set down issues as progress 
becomes possible. There were proposals to set up working groups on national implementation; 
cooperation and assistance (or an Article X cooperation mechanism); advances in science and 
technology; universalization; and compliance and confidence building. Prior to the review 
conference, there seemed to be an emerging consensus that such topics would need to be dealt 
with more regularly.14 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
States parties agreed to another intersessional work program. The core of the new 
program is similar to past efforts (two meetings—one at the expert level, the other at the states 
parties-level, destined to address an annual topic), but states parties added three standing 
agenda items (SAIs) to be addressed every year. The SAIs cover developments in science and 
technology, assistance and cooperation, and national implementation. Each SAI includes a 
range of specific issues (details of which will be dealt with in the thematic sections below). 
The amount of time devoted to formal work under the BWC did not increase despite a greater 
number of topics to be addressed.15 There was also no agreement that the new process should 
be able to make decisions—which had been proposed in the lead up to the review conference. 
It is also unclear how the new arrangements will facilitate work between formal meetings. The 
outcome from 2012 will set precedents that will be difficult to change later, and will likely 
determine whether the new process is any more flexible than the last or can lead to practical 
action outside of Geneva. 
 
Improving the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
States parties and nongovernmental organizations held informal consultations on 
improving annual exchanges of information for several years. Some progress had been made 
in identifying changes that could be made during the review conference itself and a working 
paper was tabled with specific suggestions.16 There also seemed to be strong support for a more 
ambitious attempt to reexamine from the ground up how to enhance transparency under the 
BWC, as well as build confidence in compliance.17 Prior to the review conference, there were 
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still questions to be answered. Should states parties try to increase participation before revising 
the mechanism or revise the mechanism to try to improve participation? Should states parties 
scrap what exists and start again or try to amend what is already in place? Should states parties 
try to improve the CBMs at the review conference or agree to a process afterwards? 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
There were three relevant outcomes from the review conference. States parties adopted 
a revised, simplified set of forms; made the issue of forms the topic for annual work in 2012 
and 2013; and extorted the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to continue to examine ways to 
improve electronic submission mechanisms. The review conference did not strengthen 
requirements for national infrastructure, such as nominated contact points (who gather 
pertinent information, process and submit it, and interact with other states parties). 
The forms and modalities used for exchanges of information were revised but changes 
were minimal. A form detailing meetings and conferences was deleted as this information is 
now freely available online; and part of another form, dealing with normal disease information, 
was removed as such details are now regularly reported to international health organizations. 
The overview form was also redesigned to remove ambiguities in how states were using it. The 
remaining changes were to simply update references; for example, to reflect revised editions 
of international guidance documents. Very few of the changes proposed prior to the review 
conference were adopted. 
States parties will be working on CBMs in 2012 and 2013. However, it is interesting to 
note that the aim of this work is not to enhance transparency, build confidence in compliance, 
or to review the efficacy of the current arrangements; rather, the work will focus on “how to 
enable fuller participation in the CBMs.”18 Hopefully streamlining the forms will help, but 
given the minor alterations made, the impact may be minimal. Given the stated position of 
many states that these measures are voluntary, there are clearly political issues that will still 
need to be addressed. 
 
Advances in Science and Technology 
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
In the past, the only formal review of developments in science and technology took 
place at the five yearly review conferences. Yet given the high rate of development in the life 
sciences, there have been calls to hold reviews more frequently. There have also been proposals 
for more structured procedures in order to keep abreast of scientific and technological 
advances. Many feel it is important to find a better way to consider their implications for the 
BWC.19 Discussions suggested that such advances can impact both the scope of the BWC 
(through the potential for new types of weapons, for example), and its implementation, such as 
through novel detection and diagnostic capacity or better prophylaxis and treatment options.20 
Advances in science and technology might also influence discussions on verifying the BWC. 
Preparatory meetings regularly heard the need for a three-step approach based on the following: 
(1) There were numerous calls to work more closely with those that actually do the science, as 
they are best placed to know what is currently possible; (2) there was recognition that national 
technical experts are uniquely skilled to be able to assess the implications of the advances 
identified by the scientific community; and (3) states parties themselves would need to consider 
the work of both 
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the scientists and the national technical exports in order to be able to shape their collective 
action. 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
The review conference did adopt a new standing agenda item on developments in 
science and technology. Each year, states take on two issues: annual topics and a series of 
recurring issues. The annual topics include: in 2012, advances in enabling technologies (such 
as highthroughout systems for sequencing, synthesizing, and analyzing DNA); in 2013, 
advances in technologies for surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and mitigation of infectious 
diseases, and similar occurrences caused by toxins in humans, animals, and plants; in 2014, 
advances in the understanding of pathogenicity, virulence, toxicology, immunology, and 
related issues; and in 2015, advances in production, dispersal, and delivery technologies of 
biological agents and toxins. 
The recurring issues include: new science and technology developments that have 
potential for uses contrary to the BWC; developments that have potential benefits for the BWC; 
possible measures for strengthening national biological risk management; measures to 
encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia, and industry; education and awareness 
raising about the risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology; developments relevant 
to the activities of multilateral organizations; as well as any other science and technology 
developments of relevance to the BWC. 
The review conference did not make a clear decision on the appointment of a facilitator 
for this issue. It did not determine how these issues would be worked on while the BWC was 
not in session. It also did not provide any additional avenues to engage scientists, or resources 
to facilitate their contributions to these discussions or participations in BWC meetings. It 
provided neither carrots nor sticks for taking this work forward. The review conference failed 
to formally strengthen ties between the efforts of states parties and those that actually undertake 
the science, those that appreciate the current state of play, or those that influence the 
development of future technology. The review conference also saw states parties choosing not 
to adopt a three-step approach structured to recognize the particular skill sets of the 
stakeholders involved, but to retain the ad hoc approach that had been used in the past. 
 
Universalization 
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
The Sixth Review Conference in 2006 approved a range of measures to promote 
membership of the BWC. It saw states parties agree to undertake certain tasks. It mandated the 
chairs of annual meetings the responsibility for coordinating their actions, and instructed the 
ISU to support these efforts.21 These measures did yield some results. Ten states joined the 
BWC over the course of five years. Throughout preparations for the Seventh Review 
Conference, there were many voices asserting that more remains to be done: 12 states have 
signed but not ratified the treaty and a further 19 have yet to accede.22 Discussions saw states 
parties stress the importance of expanding treaty membership, an issue repeatedly addressed 
by the president.23 It was hoped that the review conference would see an agreement to expand 
the current arrangements; to further improve the coordination of our individual outreach 
efforts; and to 
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develop roles and responsibilities. Equally, there needed to be careful thought as to what 
resources would be required to take the BWC messages out to those that need to hear it and to 
support efforts by states to join the BWC. 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
States parties reiterated the same decisions they took at the Sixth Review conference 
and provided no additional resources. 
 
Cooperation and Assistance 
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
The last few years have seen dramatic developments in the distribution of 
biotechnology capacity as well as efforts to improve cooperation and assistance. Many 
developing states now have a significant biotechnology sector, while many developed states 
do not. As a result, efforts to improve cooperation and promote assistance cannot fall along 
traditional North versus South or East versus West lines. There is a growing awareness that 
efforts to promote cooperation and assistance benefit everyone. For example, there is broad 
support to build capacity around the globe to detect, diagnose, mitigate against, and respond to 
human, animal, and plant disease events, regardless of cause. Some have suggested that current 
arrangements under the BWC do not provide enough focus to facilitate efforts to work together 
more closely. There have been calls to do more, including putting in place arrangements to 
streamline the provision of assistance; avoiding missed opportunities for cooperation among 
states parties; creating a clearing-house mechanism to match offers to provide assistance; and 
thinking about how best to continue to work on improving cooperation and assistance 
throughout the next intersessional process.24 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
The SAI on assistance and cooperation provides a firm foundation for efforts on these 
issues during the next intersessional program. States parties have undertaken to compile, 
distribute, and review national reports on the implementation of cooperation and assistance 
efforts; identify and attempt to overcome challenges and obstacles to developing international 
cooperation, assistance, and exchange in the biological sciences and technology; work to 
develop a range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation 
obligations on the peaceful use of science and technology; develop ways and means to target 
and mobilize resources, including financial ones, to address gaps and needs for assistance and 
cooperation; promote education, training, exchange, twinning programs, and other means of 
developing human resources in the biological sciences and technology; build capacity in 
biosafety and biosecurity for detecting, reporting, and responding to outbreaks of infectious 
disease or biological weapons attacks; as well as coordinate cooperation with other relevant 
international and regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. 
In addition, the review conference established a database system to facilitate requests 
and offers to provide assistance and cooperation among states parties. The database, maintained 
by the ISU, will house information provided by states parties on any requirements, needs, or 
offers 
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of assistance. States parties will then use the database to match offers with requests for 
assistance. Once a match is made, the information will be passed back to the ISU which will 
update the database accordingly. 
The review conference also established a voluntarily-funded sponsorship program to 
support and increase the participation of developing states parties in the work of the BWC. 
 
Compliance and Verification 
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
There is currently no verification regime for the BWC. Much of the 1990s was spent 
trying to develop one, but those efforts failed. There is no international consensus now or for 
the foreseeable future that such a mechanism is technically possible.25 Some states, however, 
still want to pursue a verification regime as soon as possible.26 Others see it as a longer term 
goal.27 
This is the issue with the great divergence of national views—how does the BWC approach 
this topic in a practical, depoliticized way that produces tangible security benefits for all of the 
international community? It is likely necessary to move slowly and carefully, making sure that 
all states parties are comfortable with each step before trying to obtain something more 
elaborate. There does seem to be a broad recognition that we must focus on measures that can 
command consensus and build confidence in compliance. Through their recent work program, 
states parties have found innovative ways to share information and enhance transparency. 
There is still a need to translate this transparency into confidence and compliance. 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
This issue was not explicitly covered in the outcome of the Seventh Review 
Conference, and was not included in the next work program. 
 
Institutional Support  
 
Hopes Prior to the Review Conference 
 
The institutional support states parties require after this review conference will largely 
depend on what they agree to do. Preparatory meetings heard that the more ambitious the 
intersessional work program, the more active the universalization efforts, and the more 
comprehensive efforts to improve the CBMs, the more support that will be required. States 
parties heard from the ISU that additional resources are required to continue to operate at their 
current level.28 The ISU has established its utility and demonstrated that there are core tasks 
that benefit from having such support. There were calls, including from the major funders, to 
supplement the unit’s size, resources, and stature.29 
 
Review Conference Outcome 
 
Despite a considerable amount of demand being placed on this unit (the addition of the 
three SAIs on top of the annual topic, instructions to manage a new assistance database and 
sponsorship program, and instructions to support all the decisions and recommendations 
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undertaken), no additional resources were provided. No additional staff was added and the 
unit’s 
mandate was left largely untouched. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decisions and recommendations adopted by the review conference were 
disappointing. Out of the seven areas the president set as a bar for success, there was too little 
progress in three (universalization, compliance and verification, and institutional support). In 
a further three areas minimal progress was made (advances in science and technology, 
improving the CBMs, and the next intersessional process). Solid progress was made in only 
one area (cooperation and assistance). Progress in none of these areas matched the hopes and 
expectations prior to the review conference. 
Analysis of the final declaration—the political statement states parties use to declare 
their investment in the process and the value of the treaty—reveals that there were only four 
areas in which new agreements were reached: 
 
• On the operation of the BWC – a decision was made that review conferences be held at 
least every five years. Additionally, convergence between biology and chemistry and its 
implications to the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was singled out 
for special attention. 
 
• On assistance and cooperation – states parties were urged to provide assistance to 
support the CBM process, encouraged to provide assistance to build capacity in other 
states to respond more effectively to the use of a biological weapon, and urged to provide 
assistance to countries to help them join the BWC. 
 
• On global health security – the heath security concept and a potential role for the BWC 
were included for the first time. There was an explicit reference to the International 
Health Regulations (IHR) strengthening links between the BWC and the World Health 
Organization. References to building health capacity relevant to biological weapons 
issues were strengthened and a second link added to the IHR. For the first time, there was 
also recognition of the humanitarian imperative for emergency assistance following the 
use of a biological weapon. 
 
• On education and raising awareness – the range of activities which states parties 
recognized as valuable for reaching out to their domestic scientific communities was 
expanded. 
In other areas, agreements reached at previous review conferences have been revised: 
 
• On the commitments of states parties – the active commitment for states parties to take 
national measures to detect and monitor disease events was watered down. 
 
• On biosafety and biosecurity – the reference highlighting the necessity of taking safety 
measures for transfers of relevant material was dropped, potentially weakening ties 
between the BWC and biosafety efforts. 
 
• On education and raising awareness – commitments by states parties to undertake certain 
activities with the domestic scientific communities were diminished. 
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The president’s own threshold for success does seem to have been met, and the final 
declaration seems not to have been a vehicle for substantial consolidation. Though some 
progress was made, many observers may conclude that the BWC Seventh Review Conference 
was largely a missed opportunity. 
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